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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) Utah
Code Annotated
disputed.

(1953 as amended).

Jurisdiction

is not

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, respondent The Home Insurance Company disputes the
description of the issues presented for review as contained in
appellees' brief.

It is submitted that the issues for review

are as follows:
1. Did the trial court commit error in ruling as a matter
of law that Holiday Rent-A-Car and Patricia Christiansen are
not insureds under the policy issued by The Home Insurance
Company?
2. Was the trial court correct in ruling that damages for
breach of contract are limited to the amount of compensatory
damages actually sustained by Holiday Rent-A-Car?
This appeal follows the granting of summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, the this courtfs review is to determine whether
the record on appeal demonstrates genuine facts that would
preclude summary judgment as a matter of law. Utah State Coal,
of Sr. Citizens v. UP&L, 776 P.2d 632 (Utah 1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative statutes are Utah Code Annotated §§35-1-60
and 31A-1-301(42)(43) . Because of length of the text of these
statutes, they have been set forth in their entirety in the
Addendum.
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A determinative rule is Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

This is also fully set forth in the Addendum,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Case.

In one of two cases consolidated below, The Home Insurance
Company was defendant in an action for fraud, misrepresentation, insurer bad faith, infliction of emotional distress,
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duties.
2.

Course of Proceedings Below.

The complaint against The Home Insurance Company was
commenced in the Third Judicial District Court as Civil No.
C86-7570 (R). It was eventually consolidated with a previous
and related action bearing Civil No. C81-4453 (R2).
The previous action was a personal

injury claim by

Patricia Christiansen against Holiday Rent-A-Car.

A third-

party action was brought by Holiday against Airport Shuttle
Parking alleging breach of an agreement to provide liability
insurance.

Airport was insured by Home under a general

liability policy.
The third-party action proceeded to trial where it was
determined that Airport had agreed to provide such liability
insurance. Post-trial motions resulted in an award of damages
in the amount of $15,000 plus attorney's fees.

This is the

amount Holiday paid in settlement to Christiansen of the
personal injury lawsuit.
3

The initial action, as to the third-party claim, was
appealed in Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car, 742 P. 2d 77
(Utah 1987).

This court ruled that an issue of fact existed as

to whether Holiday was insured under Home's policy.

The case

was remanded for a determination.
Upon remand
Cross-motions

consolidation

of the two cases

occurred.

for summary judgment were filed " and District

Judge Scott Daniels ruled that Holiday was not an insured under
the Home policy and granted dismissal of the complaint by
Christiansen individually and as assignee of Holiday.

This

appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This statement of relevant facts is submitted pursuant to
Rule 24(a)(7) and

in conformity with Rule 24(e).

citations "R" are to District Court Case No. C81-4453.

Record
"R2"

refers to case No., C86-7570.
a.
1.

The Parties.

Appellant

Patricia

Christiansen

(Christiansen)

brought an action for personal injuries against Holiday Rent-ACar (Holiday).
2.
was

an

(Complaint in Civil No. C81-4453, R 2-3.)

At the time she sustained her injuries Christiansen
employee

(Deposition

of

of

Airport

Christiansen,

Shuttle
pp.

Complaint, R 2-3.)

4

7-8,

Parking
R2

(Airport).

487-8.

Also,

3.

Holiday was a car rental company which leased a

portion of Airport's premises at its facility in Salt Lake
City,

(Complaint in Civil No. C81-4453, R 2-3.)
4.

It was on the portion of the business premises leased

by Holiday that Christiansen's accident occurred.

(Complaint,

R 2-3. )
5.

Third-party defendant and respondent Airport was in

the business of providing short-term and long-term parking.
Approximately

two

months

before

Christiansen's

accident,

Airport leased a portion of its premises to Holiday pursuant to
a written lease agreement.
6.

Defendant

(Lease, R2 18.)

and respondent

Home

Insurance Company

(Home) is a multi-lines insurer authorized to do business in
the

State

of Utah.

Home

liability policy to Airport.

issued

a comprehensive

general

(Complaint in Civil No. C86-7570,

R2 2-32. )
b.

Procedural Facts.

7. On June 1, 1981, Christiansen commenced an action for
personal injuries against Holiday arising from her accident on
the premises Holiday leased from Airport.
accident was February 29, 1980.
8.

The date of her

(Complaint, R 2-3.)

On or about February 22, 1982, Holiday brought a

third-party

action

against Airport.

Holiday alleged

that

Airport had agreed to obtain insurance for the benefit of
Holiday and that Airport "failed to obtain said insurance,
5

thereby breaching the agreement . . . "

(Third-Party Complaint,

R 108-113.)
9.

On September 30, 1982, a settlement was entered into

between Christiansen and Holiday.

The agreement provided that

Holiday would pay $15,000 to Christiansen for her personal
injury claim. Holiday also assigned its claims against Airport
and Home to Christiansen.
execute

In return Christiansen agreed not to

judgment against Holiday beyond

$15,000.

Neither

Airport nor Home were parties to the settlement agreement.
(Settlement Agreement of September 30, 1982, R 190-193.)
10.

Judgment was entered on October 1, 1982, by Judge

Philip R. Fishier of the Third District against Holiday in the
amount of $246,000 pursuant to the settlement and stipulated
damages between Christiansen and Holiday.
11.

The action

by Christiansen

(R 197-198.)

against

Holiday

was

bifurcated and proceeded to trial on the third-party claim by
Holiday against Airport
provide insurance.

for alleged breach of contract to

A jury determined that Airport had agreed

to provide liability insurance for the benefit of Holiday.
(Jury Verdict, R 24 8.)
12.

Following the jury verdict, the trial court, through

Judge Scott Daniels, set damages at $15,000 plus attorney's
fees in favor of Holiday and against Airport.
Decision of September 23, 1983, R 485-8.)
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(Memorandum

13.

Christiansen appealed the damage award of Judge

Daniels. Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car, 742 P.2d 77 (Utah
1987) .
14.

While Civil No. C81-4453 was on appeal, Christiansen

commenced a separate action against Airport and, for the first
time, named the Home Insurance Company.
15.

(Complaint, R2 2-32.)

All defendants, except for Home, were dismissed from

this new action by order of District Judge Dennis Frederick.
That order has not been appealed.
16.

(R2 139-40.)

This court then issued its opinion, holding that

before damages could be set, it must

first be determined

whether or not Holiday was an insured under the policy issued
by Home.
17.

(See 742 P.2d at 79.)
Following remand to the trial court, the initial

action (Civil No. C81-4453) and the action against Home (Civil
No. C86-7570) were consolidated.
c.

(R2 462-4.)

Facts Pertinent to Appeal.

The facts set forth above hopefully provide an adequate
background for the Court. Those facts specifically relevant to
the present appeal, and which are established by the record,
are as follows:
18.

Christiansen was, at the time of her accident, an

employee of Airport.

(Christiansen Deposition, pp. 7-8, R2

487-8.)
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19.

Christiansen has not asserted a claim for personal

injuries against Airport in either action.

(Complaints, R 2-3,

R2 2-32. )
20.

Home issued a comprehensive general liability policy

to Airport, Policy No. BOP-863546.

Named insureds are Airport

and its principals, Rex Howell and Harold Hinckley.

(R2 194-

219, 536-542.)
21.

Christiansen does not claim to be a named insured.

As stated in her answers to Request for Admissions:
Plaintiffs, excluding Christiansen# claim
they are insureds under the [Home] policy
(See Answers to Request for
Admissions,
dated
July
31,
1987.)
(emphas is added.)
(R2 422.)
22.

Christiansen admitted

to having no knowledge or

information with regard to the insurance in effect for her
employer, Airport, and whether it extended to include Holiday
Rent-A-Car as a named insured.

(Deposition of Christiansen,

pp. 31-33, R2 489.)
23.

The principals of Airport; Rex Howell and Harold

Hinckley, stated in their respective affidavits that they never
procured nor intended to procure liability insurance on behalf
of

Holiday.

(Affidavit

of

Harold

Hinckley,

R2

219, and

Affidavit of Rex Howell, R2 221.)
24.

The principals of Holiday admitted that they had no

contacts or dealings with agents or representatives of Home
8

prior

to

Christiansen's

accident

of

February

29,

1980.

(Deposition of David Lingard, pp. 23-24, 25-26, R2 506-7;
Deposition of Don Maw, pp. 7-8, R2 508-9; Affidavit of Craig
Lingard, R2 510; testimony of John Lingard in trial proceedings
of Civil No. C81-4453, pp. 8-10, 29, 39, R2 513-20.)
25.

No application for insurance was submitted by or on

behalf of Holiday to Home.

(Affidavits of Howell, R2 219,

Hinckley, R2 221, and Affidavit of James Guthrie, R2 258-60,
also Deposition of Gene Denning, pp. 52-53, R2 530.)
26. Mr. Gene Denning, an independent insurance agent, who
acted

as

broker

for

Howell

and

Hinckley,

testified

that

suggestions made to Howell and Hinckley as to how they might
extend the existing policy with Home to cover tenants such as
Holiday, was not observed.
this

purpose was

not

The language Denning suggested for

incorporated

between Airport and Holiday.

into the written

lease

(Deposition of Gene Denning, pp.

21-22, 30, 32, 41-42, 60, 61, R2 521-35.)
27.

Home has never disputed that it insured Airport to

the extent of coverage provided by its policy.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly dismissed

the complaint of

Christiansen in her individual and assignee capacities.
theories contained

in said complaint are predicated

The

on an

insured-insurer relationship between Home and either Holiday or
Christiansen.

In the trial court as here, there has been no
9

showing to support such a relationship.

Likewise, no such

relationship can be implied from statements or conduct of Home
representatives or its attorneys, nor from the contractual
liability coverage afforded by Home's policy.

Finally, the

trial court correctly measured damages as limited to the amount
actually

incurred

by

Holiday

in consequence

of

Airportfs

failure to obtain insurance.
ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
COMPLAINT AGAINST HOME.

DISMISSED

THE

Home will demonstrate that no facts existed before the
trial court and that none have been shown in this appeal to
support a finding that either Christiansen or Holiday were
insureds of Home.

As a matter of law, the claims asserted by

Christiansen, individually and as assignee of Holiday, fail for
lack of privity of contract.
It will also be shown that no contract of insurance can be
implied as a matter of law from alleged representations or
conduct made during the course of this litigation.
A.

No Facts Have Been Produced Showing a Contract of
Insurance Between Home and Christiansen or Holiday,

Despite the fervor of Christiansen's appeal, no facts have
been produced below or in the present appeal in support of her
claim that either she or Holiday are insureds under Home's
policy.

In fact, Christiansen has previously admitted that she
10

does not claim to be an insured and her brief in this matter
admits

that

Holiday

is

not

an

insured

of

Home.

After

establishing that there is no basis for an express contract of
insurance, it will be shown that there can be no implied
contract of insurance contrary to the arguments of appellants,
1.

No Express Contract of Insurance Exists Between
Home and Christiansen or Holiday.

Christiansen and Holiday claim to be "insureds" under the
policy issued by Home to Airport.
No. BOP-863546.

The policy in question is

The only named insureds under said policy are

Rex Howell, Harold Hinckley and the partnership -- Airport
Shuttle
Requests

Parking.

Christiansen

admitted

in

responses

to

for Admissions that she does not claim to be an

insured under the Home policy:
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that no policy
of insurance has been issued by defendant
Home Insurance Company with any of the
above-named
plaintiffs,
jointly
or
severally, as named insured on said
policy.
RESPONSE:
follows:

Admits

and

denies

as

(a) Plaintiffs do not know if Home
Insurance, or its agent Gene Denning, made
entries indicating plaintiffs, excluding
Christiansen, were named, designated or
noted as insureds by Home under its
existing premises liability coverage for
Airport Shuttle.
(b) Plaintiffs had not received any
document naming them as insureds under the
said policy.
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(c)
Plaintiffs,
excluding
Christiansen, claim they are insureds
under thus said policy . . . .
(emphasis
added.)
(R2 422.)
In her deposition

Christiansen

admits

to having no

knowledge or information as to what, if any, insurance was in
effect on behalf of her employer at the time of her accident
and whether it extended to others such as Holiday. (Deposition
of Christiansen, pp. 31-33, R2 489.) There is no evidence that
Christiansen ever submitted an application for insurance to
Home.

(Affidavit of James Guthrie, R2 258-60.)

Indeed, if

Christiansen were an insured of Home, she would have no reason
to take an assignment from Holiday of rights or claims against
Home.
In her brief Christiansen fails to point to any facts in
support of a claim to be insured by Home.

Her brief merely

argues that Home's policy "provides coverage for Holiday as to
plaintiff's claim of bodily injury". (Brief of Appellants, pp.
18-26. )
The same conclusion applies to Holiday.

That is, no

evidence can support a finding that Home insured Holiday.

It

is apparent that Christiansen still confuses "coverage" with
the existence of an insured-insurer relationship.
At page 24 of appellants' brief, the following concession
is made:

12

While it is correct that Holiday was not a
"named" or "additional insured" it was a
party to which the limits of the policy
attached and for which Home could either
pay the claim made against Holiday or
could
defend
Holiday
to
keep
such
obligation from being incurred, (emphasis
added.)
This admission is compelled by the dearth of evidence of
a first-party, insured-insurer relationship between Holiday and
Home.

Indeed, all evidence is to the contrary, including:

(1)

The principals of Holiday testified that they had no contacts
or dealings with representatives of Home.

(Deposition of David

Lingard, pp. 23-24, 25-26, R2 506-7; Deposition of Don Maw, pp.
7-8, R2 508-9; Affidavit of Craig Lingard, R2 510; testimony of
John Lingard, pp. 8-10, 29, 39, R2 513-20.)

(2) The under-

writing representative of Home Insurance Company, Mr. James
Guthrie, testified that at no time was an application for
insurance received by Home from Holiday.

(R2 258-60.)

(3) The

independent agent assisting Airport Shuttle, Mr. Gene Denning,
testified that no application or request for insurance with
Home was ever submitted on behalf of Holiday.
Gene Denning, pp. 52-53, R2 530.)

(Deposition of

(4) And the principals of

Home's insured, Airport, have consistently testified that at no
time did the approach Home for the purpose of extending Home's
policy to cover Holiday as a tenant of the business premises.
(Affidavits of Harold Hinckley and Rex Howell, R2 219, 221.)
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In summary, no facts have been produced, either below or
in this appeal, for finding a first-party relationship of
insurer-insured

between

Home

and

either

Christiansen

or

Holiday.
2.

No Basis Exists
Insurance.

to

Imply

a

Contract

of

An implied contract or estoppel theory can be summarily
dismissed because the complaint against Home fails to allege
either theory.
Accordingly,
disregard

(See Complaint in Civil No. C86-7570, R2 2-32.)
it

would

be

appropriate

for

such theories as may be raised

this

court

to

in this appeal.

Banqerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983).
Should this court consider the merits of such theories,
the facts set forth above establish a lack of contact between
Home and either Christiansen or Holiday on the subject of Home
providing insurance for the benefit of Holiday.

Christiansen

urges that such a contract of insurance can be found in (1)
representations

or

conduct

of

Home's

representatives

or

attorneys or (2) in the coverage provided by the contractual
liability provision of Home's policy with Airport.
As

to

the

first

argument,

Christiansen

cites

the

independent insurance agent, Gene Denning, as the only source
of a statement or conduct occurring before the accident to
Christiansen.

Home

has

always

that

nothing

represented by Mr. Denning can be binding upon Home.

Denning

14

maintained

described himself as a "broker" acting on behalf of his clients
Howell and Hinckley.
R2

521-35.)

individual

(Deposition of Gene Denning, pp. 18, 57,

Denning

authority

was

an

from Home.

independent

agent

with

no

(Denning Deposition, pp.

35-36, 39, R2 521-35.)
As such, Mr. Denning, if anything, is the agent of the
insureds, not Home.

See Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y.,

761 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1988), and S31A-1-301 (42) (43) , Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
However, further assuming that statements by Denning could
attributed to Home, there is no evidence that such statements
were made

to Christiansen

or Holiday.

There

is also no

evidence that they relied upon such statements or conduct. Mr.
Denning made it clear in his deposition that his only contacts
were with Messrs. Howell and Hinckley of Airport.

He also

stated that his "suggestions" as to how coverage might be
extended to include Holiday were not adopted:
Q. (By Mr. King) As the agent, this
is what you advised them, is it not?
A. Well, frankly, the way the lease
agreement is worded/ Sam, I donft agree
with you because there isn't an assumption
of liability under the lease agreement.
There is simply an assumption of premium
payments. (emphas is added.)
(Deposition of Gene Denning, p. 21, R2 521.)
All other statements and conduct relied on by Christiansen
to support an estoppel or implied contract theory occurred ex
15

post facto.

That is, all the "examples" cited in her brief

were after the eiccident and during this litigation.

This

includes the tender by Home of payment for the judgment amount
of $15,000 plus attorneyfs fees.
show

no

reliance

on

such

Therefore, Christiansen can

statements

or

conduct

to

her

detriment. Lack of detrimental reliance is fatal to a claim of
estoppel.

Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688

(Utah 1985); Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652
P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982); United America Life Ins. Co. v. Zions
First National Bank 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982).
Christiansen next argues that there is "coverage" for
Holiday under the contractual liability provisions of Home's
policy

with

Airport.

This

argument

plainly

manifests

Christiansen's confusion between coverage for a given claim and
status as an insured.

As stated by District Court Judge Scott

Daniels in his Memorandum Decision of April 13, 1989:
The distinction is subtle, but important:
Home
does
not
insure
Holiday
for
Christiansen1s claim against Holiday, but
it does insure Airport for Holiday's claim
against Airport.
The
reason
the
distinction
is
important is that Home, not insuring
Holiday, does not owe Holiday a duty to
defend, duties of good faith, or other
duties an insurer owes to its insured,,
The contractual

liability coverage afforded by Home's

policy arises as an exception to a policy exclusion.
found at page 10 of Home's policy as Exclusion (e):
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It is

Under Coverage E, to liability assumed by
the
insured
under
any
contract
or
agreement except an insured contract; but
this exclusion does not apply to reliance
upon a representation or warranty made
with respect to the Named Insured's
product or work performed by or on behalf
of the Named Insured; (emphasis added.)
Thus, it is the "insured contract" of the "named insured"
to which this coverage applies.
liability

coverage

Nothing in Home's contractual

promotes Holiday

to the

status

of

"an

insured."
As discussed above, there is no basis to find either
Christiansen

or

Holiday

to

be

"named

insureds."

The

distinction that has eluded Christiansen is that although there
may

be

"coverage"

for Holiday's

breach

of contract

claim

against Airport under Home's policy, such coverage does not
make Holiday

an insured

of Home.

This reasoning, though

simple, defeats Christiansen's entire case against Home.
B.
It

There is No Liability on the Part of Home Absent a
Contract of Insurance With Christiansen or Holiday.
has

been

shown

that

no

factual

basis

exists

to

establish a contract of insurance between Home and either
Christiansen or Holiday from whom Christiansen takes by way of
assignment.

Neither can such a contractual relationship be

implied from any of the statements or conduct of the parties.
Utah case law consistently holds that the absence of an
insured-insurer relationship is an absolute barrier to a claim
by a third-party against the wrongdoer's liability insurer.
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Lack of privity of contract was a bar to the claim of a
judgment

creditor

against

the

judgment

debtor's

liability

insurer in Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 261,
430 P.2d 576 (Utah 1967).

Also, in Campbell v. Staqq, 596 P.2d

1037 (Utah 1979), this court described the legal impediment to
such a claim as follows:
In Utah, a plaintiff must direct his
action against the actual tort-feasor, not
the insurer.
The fact that plaintiff
signed a release agreement which named the
insurer as a releasee does not change the
nature of the rights between plaintiff and
the insurer; plaintiff has no direct cause
of action against the insurer which he
could release. Plaintifffs only cause of
action lies against defendant, which is an
action in tort.
596 P.2d at 1039.
Additional

Utah

case

authority

requiring

privity

of

contract in an action against the liability insurer includes:
Auerbach Co. v. Key Security Policy, Inc., 680 P.2d 740 (Utah
1984), note 3 at p. 743; and Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108,
433 P.2d 846 (1967).

See also, opinion of the Utah Court of

Appeals in Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P. 2d 950 (Utah
App. 1989.)
This

court

has

also

held

that

liability

insurance

contracts cannot be construed as being third-party beneficiary
contracts for the benefit of injured third-party claimants. As
stated in Dairvland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P. 2d 737 (Utah
1982) :
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The Halls [injured third parties] also
challenged
the
dismissal
of
their
counterclaim and cross claim relying upon
[case citation omitted], for support.
[That case] held that an injured third
party should be treated as a third-party
beneficiary
under
the
tort-feasor's
insurance contract. This is not the law
in this jurisdiction and will not be
relied upon by this court to reverse the
trial court's decision, (emphasis added.)
646 P.2d at 740.
Christiansen is properly seen as the employee of Home's
insured who never has asserted a direct claim against the named
insured.

This is because as an employee of Airport, her claim

would be statutorily barred under U.C.A. §35-1-60.
Holiday,

again

there

is

no

evidence

of

a

As to

contractual

relationship with Home. Thus, assignment of Holiday's "rights"
to Christiansen adds nothing to her standing viz-a-viz Home.
Having established that no privity of contract exists, the
claims asserted in the complaint against Home will be reviewed
seriatim.

In each instance, the claim fails due to the lack of

a first-party relationship.
1.

Fraud and Misrepresentation.

The first theories that can be inferred from the complaint
are for fraud and misrepresentation.

It is apparent that the

"fraud" Home is alleged to have committed is in denying the
tender

of

defense

Christiansen.

submitted

by

Holiday

when

sued

by

Such a claim of fraud is disposed of by the
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validity of Home's position that it did not insure Holiday.
Absent

a

falsehood,

misrepresentation.

there

can

be

no

claim

for

fraud

Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson,

P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980).

or
610

See also, Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607

P.2d 293 (Utah 1980), and Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873
(Utah 1978).

In Sugarhouse Finance Co., this court addressed

the requirements for fraud and misrepresentation:
A finding of fraud requires a showing of a
false
representation
of
an
existing
material
fact,
made
knowingly
or
recklessly for the purpose of inducing
reliance thereon upon which plaintiff
reasonably
relies
to his detriment.
Misrepresentation may be made either by
affirmative statement or by material
omission, where there exists a duty to
speak. (emphasis added.)
610 P.2d at 1373.
2.

Insurer Bad Faith.

To state the claim merely begs the question; was Home the
insurer of Holiday or Christiansen?

The answer has heretofore

been shown to be an unequivocal "no".

Absent such a first-

party relationship, there can be no claim since this theory
sounds exclusively

in contract.

See Beck v. Farmers Ins.

Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
The ruling of this court in Beck was applied by the Utah
Court of Appeals in Arnica Mut. Ins. v. Schettler to uphold
dismissal of a claim of insurer bad faith where it was shown
that no such privity of contract or first-party relationship
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existed at the time of the alleged bad faith conduct.

Also

citing the earlier decision of this court in Ammerman v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, and of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 364 (Okla. 1984),
the court in Arnica held:
In order to maintain an action under a
contractual theory of insurer bad faith,
the parties must be in privity of contract
at the time of the alleged wrong,
(emphasis added.)
768 P.2d at 958.
3.

Infliction of Emotional Distress.

The next theory that can be deduced from the complaint is
for infliction of emotional distress. Here again, the veracity
of

Home's

position

in denying

coverage

to Holiday

as

an

insured, is a bar to such a claim.
Moreover, under standards adopted by this court, the
conduct of Home in not extending "insured" status to Holiday,
even if incorrect, could not constitute conduct of such an
outrageous nature to be actionable.

This court in Larson v.

Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989), readopted the standard
first applied in Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344
(1961).

There it was held that a plaintiff must show:
The defendant intentionally engaged in
some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a)
with the purpose of inflicting emotional
distress, or, (b) where any reasonable
person would have known that such would
result; and his actions are of such a
nature as to be considered outrageous and
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intolerable in that they offend against
the
generally
accepted
standards
of
decency and morality.
11 Utah 2d at 293, 358 P.2d at 347.
Although this court has relaxed the requirement that the
conduct be "intentional", it is still true that the conduct
complained of must be "intolerable" or "extreme" in nature. In
the present case, not only did Home have a good faith basis for
refusing to extend its policy to include Holiday as an insured,
but Holiday has failed to show justification, in fact or law,
why it should be regarded as Home's insured.
4.

Breach of Contract
Duties.

and

Breach

of

Fiduciary

The final two theories are for breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duties.

Dismissal is self-evident given

the lack of privity of contract running between Home and either
Christiansen or Holiday.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY MEASURED
DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED HOLIDAY.

THE

Christiansen claims that the trial court erred in awarding
$15,000 plus attorneyfs fees instead of approximately $246,000.
This award was made based on the third-party action by Holiday
against

Airport

for

liability insurance.

breach

of

the

agreement

to

provide

It is undisputed that Holiday paid only

$15,000 to Airport under the terms of the settlement agreement.
The amount Christiansen seeks to recover was uncontested by
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Holiday under the terms of the settlement agreement between
Holiday and Christiansen.
This respondent incorporates by reference and adopts the
points and authorities contained in the brief of respondent
Airport Shuttle Parking on the issue of the correct measure of
damages.

However, in the interest of a final resolution of

this matter, Home will show that the damages awarded by Judge
Daniels were correctly measured.
Utah case law has adopted various descriptions of the
measure of damages in a breach of contract action.

However,

regardless of the specific wording of the formula, the result
in the present case is the same.
In Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Std. West, Inc. 755
P.2d

162

(Utah 1988), the court announced the formula for

determining breach of contract damages as follows:
In general, the contractual damages are
measured by the lost benefit of the
bargain, i.e., by "the amount necessary to
place the non-breaching party in as good a
position as if the contract had been
performed."
755 P.2d at 164.
Applying this formula to the present case, it is clear
that Holiday would be in the same position had the contract
been performed by the award set by the court, that is, $15,000
plus Holiday's

attorney's

fees.
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The

same measurement

of

damages was used by this court in Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d
692 (Utah 1982) .
Slightly different language was used by this court in
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P.2d 197
(1969), where it is stated:
The non-breaching party should receive the
award which will put him in as good a
position as he would have been in had
there been no breach of contract.
455 P.2d at 198.

Again, application of this standard produces

the result reached by the trial court.

It is important to note

that the "non-breaching party" in this case is Holiday, not
Christiansen. Accordingly, there can be no basis to award more
than $15,000 plus attorney's fees since it is Holiday to be
compensated, not Christiansen.
A Wisconsin case is factually very similar to the one
under appeal and further demonstrates the correctness of the
trial court's award.

In Bentley v. Favas, 260 Wis. 177, 50

N.W.2d 404 (1951), the owner of an orchard contracted with the
defendant to drive laborers to the owner's orchard.

As a part

of the agreement, the owner agreed to provide defendant with
liability insurance. An accident resulted and defendant became
liable to various laborers who sustained injuries.
the

owner

had

not

obtained

the

insurance

Although

agreed

upon,

defendant's liability was paid for under his own automobile
liability insurance policy. Notwithstanding, defendant claimed
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that the owner was
insurance.

liable

for the

failure

to obtain

the

The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed holding that

"the liability of one who breaches a contract to procure
insurance is to pay damages, and is not that of an insurer."
50 N.W.2d at 409. The court then reasoned that since defendant
had sustained

no out-of-pocket damages, there could be no

recovery.
Given that the claim upon which the damages in this action
are premised is the third-party breach of contract claim by
Holiday against Airport, there is no justification for an award
in excess of Holiday's actual damages, i.e., $15,000 plus
attorney's fees.

It is undisputed that this amount has been

tendered to Christiansen as assignee of Holiday.
CONCLUSION
This respondent submits that resolution of this appeal is
not complicated.

The simple truth is that Home did not insure

Christiansen nor did it insure Holiday.

No factual basis

exists to find an express contract of insurance.

Likewise, no

factual basis exists to find an implied contract nor to apply
the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Appellants' argument

notwithstanding, nothing stated by Home or its representatives
creates a contractual relationship. Appellants' arguments also
fail because the alleged representations and contacts were
either subsequent to Christiansen's injury or not relied upon
by Christiansen or Holiday.
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This

court

should

affirm

the trial

court's

award

damages in the amount of $15,000 plus attorney's fees.

of

That

amount is the correct measure of the damages actually sustained
by Holiday in consequence of Airport's breach of the agreement
to provide liability insurance.

A higher award of damages

would be superlative to the loss sustained by Holiday.
Respectfully submitted this / 7 - day of February, 1991.

S/ Baird Morgan 7 /
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ADDENDUM

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-1-60
35-1-60.

—

Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent
or employee -- Occupational disease excepted.

The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee,
whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive
remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in
place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at
common law or otherwise, to such employee or-to his spouse,
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs,
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in
any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred by such
employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an
employer or against any officer, agent or employee of the
employer based upon any accident, injury or death or an
employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an
employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the
industrial commission of Utah for compensation in those cases
with the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Act, as amended.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, S31A-1-301(42) —
(42)
"Insurance agent" or "agent" means a person who
represents insurers in soliciting, negotiating, or placing
insurance. Refer to Subsection 31A-23-102(3) for exceptions to
this definition.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, §31a-l-301(43)

—

(43) "Insurance broker" or "broker" means a person who
acts in procuring insurance on behalf of an applicant for
insurance or an insured, and does not act on behalf of the
insurer except by collecting premiums or performing other
ministerial acts. Refer also to Subsection 31A-23-102(3) for
exceptions to this definition.

RULE 56.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

(a)
For claimant.
A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to
all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing,
the adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith
if
the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability aline
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually
and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing
such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the
trial of the action the fact so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e)
Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented

or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential
to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to
the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the
affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of
the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable
attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
judged guilty of contempt.

